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Recent Developments in
Pennsylvania Criminal Law
Patrick Carothers*& Christopher M. Turak**
CRIMINAL LAw - SEARCHES AND SEIZURES - THERMAL IMAGING DEVICE
- The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the warrantless use
of an infrared thermal imaging device to scan a private residence
for evidence of criminal activity violates the Fourth Amendment.
Commonwealth v. Gindlesperger, 743 A.2d 898 (Pa. 1999).
In early 1994, Erie resident Gregory Gindlesperger was using
artificial light to grow marijuana plants in his basement.1 Acting on
a tip from a confidential informant but without a search warrant,
police scanned Gindlesperger's house using an infrared thermal
imaging device and detected "an unexplainable source of heat
coming from the basement area."2 "[T]his heat source would be
consistent with the heat source coming from the artificial lighting
used in the growing of marijauna."3 Pursuant to a search warrant,
on April 9, 1994, police officers entered Gindlesperger's basement
and seized twenty-one marijuana plants. 4 The search warrant was
issued based on the results of the infrared thermal imaging
surveillance and on the information provided by the confidential
informant.5 Gindlesperger was arrested and charged with a
violation of the Controlled Substance, Drug, Device and Cosmetic
Act.'
Gindlesperger filed a pre-trial motion to suppress the evidence
seized during the search of his residence, asserting that the
scanning of his residence with the thermal imaging device; without
* Research Editor, Volume 38, Duquesne Law Review; J.D. 2000, Duquesne University
School of Law; B.S.B.A. 1996, Robert Morris College.
** Research Editor, Volume 38, Duquesne Law Review; J.D. 2000, Duquesne University
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1. See Commonwealth v. Gindlesperger, 743 A.2d 898, 898 (Pa. 1999).
2. Gindlesperger, 743 A.2d at 898-99.
3. Id. at 899.
4. See id.
5. See id.
6. See id; the Controlled Substance, Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
35, §§ 780-101 to 780-178 (West 1999).
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first obtaining a search warrant, was a violation of the Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution.7 After denial of the
pre-trial motion, a bench trial was conducted, and Gindlesperger
was found guilty of all charges.8 Gindlesperger then appealed to the
Pennsylvania Superior Court, which reversed the trial court's
decision, holding that the warrantless use of the thermal imaging
device was not a proper basis for the subsequent search warrant.9
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, stating that this is a case of first
impression, granted allocatur.10
Justice Stephen A. Zappala wrote the opinion for the majority,
which initially pointed out that the fundamental interest protected
by the Fourth Amendment, the right to be free from unreasonable
searches and seizures, is protected by the requirement that
searches be conducted pursuant to a warrant issued by an
independent judicial officer based upon probable cause. The court
continued by describing the test enunciated by the United States
Supreme Court in Katz v. United States12 for what constitutes an
unreasonable search: "one asserting that an unlawful search has
occurred [must] demonstrate, first, an actual, subjective
expectation of privacy in that which is searched and second, that
this expectation is one our society recognizes to be reasonable."
1 3
7. Gindlesperger, 743 A.2d at 899. The Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or Affrmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.
U.S. CONST. art IV.
8. Gindlesperger, 743 A.2d at 899. Gindlesperger was convicted by Judge Connelly in
the Erie County Court of Common Pleas, Criminal Division, No. 01515-1994. See id. at 898.
9. See id. at 899.
10. Id. at 898. At the supreme court, attorney Garrett A. Taylor, the Assistant District
Attorney for Erie County, represented the Commonwealth, and attorney Elliot J. Segel from
Erie represented Gindlesperger. Id.
Justice Stephen A. Zappala wrote the opinion for the majority of the court, which included
Chief Justice John P. Flaherty, Jr., and Justices Ralph J. Cappy, Sandra Schultz Newman, and
Thomas G. Saylor. Id. at 898-906. Justice Russell M. Nigro concurred in the result with no
opinion. Id. at 906. Justice Ronald D. Castille filed a dissenting opinion. Id. at 906-07
(Castille, J., dissenting).
11. Id. at 900. The court noted that Gindlesperger also asserted a state constitutional
challenge under Article 1, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. Id. at 899 n.3. The
court concluded that the use of a thermal imaging device was also a violation of the
Pennsylvania Constitution, because the Pennsylvania Constitution provides a notion of
privacy stronger than that of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Id.
12. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
13. Gindlesperger, 743 A.2d at 900 (citing Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J.,
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While pointing out that the Supreme Court has never decided the
constitutionality of the warrantless use of thermal imaging devices,
the Gindlesperger court reviewed several differing opinions of
federal circuit courts, federal district courts, and state courts.14 The
Commonwealth's argument relied upon cases upholding the use of
thermal imaging devices, which analogize the "heat waste"
emanating from a home to that of discarded trash15 or the odor that
escapes a compartment or building that is detected by a drug
sniffing canine.
1 6
Courts holding that the warrantless use of a thermal imaging
device is constitutional have stated that the thermal imaging device
is passive in nature, and does not intrude upon the interior of the
property revealing any intimacy of detail. 17 Such courts stress that
thermal imaging only indicates "hot spots" on the roof and walls of
the building under surveillance. 8
In contrast, courts finding the warrantless use of a thermal
imaging device to be unconstitutional have asserted that thermal
imaging reveals intimate details regarding the activities occurring
within the home. 19 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in adopting
this analysis, found the United States Supreme Court's decision in
United States v. Karo'° informative.
2'
concurring)).
14. Id. at 901. The Seventh, Eighth, Ninth and Eleventh Circuits as well as one district
court in the Ninth Circuit have upheld the warrantless use of thermal imaging devices by law
enforcement, while the Tenth Circuit, one district court in the Seventh Circuit, and the State
Supreme Courts of Montana and Washington and the Court of Appeal of California have held
such warrantless use to be unconstitutional. Id.
15. Id. The Supreme Court has held that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy
in an individual's discarded trash. See California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988). The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court distinguished this case, stating that the Supreme Court, in the
Greenwood analysis, focused on the voluntary nature of Greenwood's relinquishment of his
trash into the hands of third parties, which is significantly different than that of the
involuntary emanation of heat from one's home. Gindlesperger, 743 A.2d at 901.
16. Gindlesperger, 743 A.2d at 901. The Supreme Court has held that a warrantless
search by a drug sniffing canine is not a violation of the Fourth Amendment. See United
States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court distinguished this case,
stating that the Supreme Court, in the Place analysis, focused on the dog's ability to detect
the particular smells of illegal contraband, while the thermal imager cannot distinguish
between legal and illegal activities within the home. Gindlesperger, 743 A.2d at 901.
17. Gindlesperger, 743 A.2d at 902.
18. Id.
19. Id. These courts have held that the issue is not whether an individual has an
expectation of privacy in the heat emanating from the home, but rather, whether the
individual has an expectation of privacy in the activities occurring within his home. Id. at
903.
20. 468 U.S. 705 (1984).
21. Gindlesperger, 743 A.2d at 905.
Duquesne Law Review
In Karo, government agents, acting without a warrant, installed a
beeper into a can of ether used for cocaine processing, and then
tracked the movements of the can into a private residence.22 Based
partially on the information derived from the beeper, the agents
obtained a search warrant for the residence.2 The Supreme Court
ruled that the monitoring of a beeper in a private residence was a
violation of the Fourth Amendment because it revealed critical
facts that would not otherwise be available without a warrant.
24
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court likened the beeper in Karo to
that of the thermal imaging device in the present case, and held
that the warrantless use of a thermal imaging device violates the
Fourth Amendment.
25
Justice Ronald D. Castille filed a dissenting opinion, in which he
argued that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in the
heat vented from one's home.26 Unlike the majority, he concluded
that thermal imaging does not reveal intimate details regarding the
activities within a home, but rather, measures only "heat waste"
emanating from a home and is no different than using binoculars to
enhance what can be lawfully observed. 27 Justice Castille concluded
by emphasizing that the police here were not using the thermal
imaging device in a random sweep of the neighborhood, but instead
were using it as an investigative tool to confirm information
provided by a confidential informant.
In this significant case, Pennsylvania has departed from the
holdings in many federal cases by prohibiting the warrantless use
of thermal imaging devices to conduct surveillance. The United
States Supreme Court has granted certiorari in a case involving
substanially the same issue.28
CRIMINAL LAW - EVIDENCE - SCOPE OF CROSS-EXAMINATION OF A
CRIMINAL DEFENDANT'S CHARACTER WITNESS - The Pennsylvania
Supreme Court held that a criminal defendant's character witness,




25. Id. at 906.
26. Gindlesperger, 743 A.2d at 906 (Castille, J., dissenting).
27. Id. (Castille, J., dissenting). Justice Castille would have adopted the approach
enunciated by the Eleventh Circuit in United States v. Ford, 34 F3d 992 (11th Cir. 1994)
(likening the absence of an individual's privacy right in the "waste heat" emanating from
their home to that of an individual's trash, as held in California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35
(1988)).
28. See United States v. Kyllo, No. 99-8508 (U.S. 2000).
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be questioned on cross-examination about knowledge of allegations
of specific prior instances of misconduct that did not result in
arrest.
Commonwealth v. Morgan, 739 A.2d 1033 (Pa. 1999).
In March of 1994, Wesley Morgan was charged with deviate
sexual intercourse, indecent assault, indecent exposure, and related
offenses stemming from his alleged sexual attacks against a young
girl that he was babysitting.29 The Commonwealth's witness list for
the trial included two people who planned to testify that Morgan
had sexually molested them twenty years earlier.30 No charges had
ever been filed against Morgan based on these incidents, nor had
any arrests been effectuated.31 Morgan's attorney feared that the
Commonwealth would use this information to also impeach the
good character witnesses called by Morgan during the course of
the trial.32 Based on this information, Morgan filed a motion in
limine seeking to prevent the Commonwealth from cross-examining
his good character witnesses about these alleged prior acts that did
not result in arrest or convictionY. The trial court denied the
motion.3 4 As a result, Morgan did not call any character witnesses
at trial to testify as to his good moral character and chastity.3 5 On
March 17, 1994, a jury convicted Morgan of all charges.
36
Morgan then appealed the denial of the motion in limine to the
Pennsylvania Superior Court.37  The superior court, in an
unpublished opinion, affirmed the ruling of the trial court.38 Upon
the filing of. a petition for allowance of appeal, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court granted allocatur.
3 9
The sole issue on appeal was whether the prosecution, on
cross-examination of the defendant's character witnesses, may pose
questions dealing with mere allegations of the defendant's past
criminal conduct in order to impeach the character witnesses'
credibility.40
29. See Commonwealth v. Morgan, 739 A.2d 1033 (Pa, 1999).
30. See Morgan, 739 A-2d at 1034.
31. See id.
32. See id. at 1035.
33. See id.
34. See id.





40. Morgan, 739 A.2d at 1035. At the supreme court, attorney Timothy Paul Dawson
2000
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In a majority opinion by Justice Russell M. Nigro, the supreme
court held that such queries, based solely on allegations made
against the defendant, could not be asked of that defendant's
character witnesses on cross examination." The court set forth the
general rule that a character witness who takes the stand and
testifies about a party's good character may be impeached by
questions regarding the party's bad character.42 However, the court
was quick to point out that the impeaching questions may not be
overly prejudicial to the defendant.43
In this matter, Morgan wanted to prevent the Commonwealth
from cross-examining Morgan's character witnesses about their
knowledge of past allegations of Morgan's sexual misconduct made
by two people in the community." While no charges were ever filed
against Morgan, the alleged victims had stated publicly that Morgan
had abused them.45 In deciding this case, the court relied heavily
upon its holding in Commonwealth v. Scott.4 The Scott court held
that it is unfairly prejudicial to allow the prosecution to
cross-examine the criminal defendant's character witnesses
regarding the defendant's previous arrests that never resulted in
convictions, because such arrests are equally consistent with
innocence as with guilt.47 Similarly, in this case, the court held that
questions regarding the defendant's past that dealt with mere
allegations would subject Morgan to the same unfair prejudice.48
The court also noted that asking a character witness if they had
ever "heard" of any allegations of the defendant's misconduct has
historically been a favorite way for trial attorneys to get around the
general prohibition on introducing extrinsic evidence of a
from Adamsburg represented Morgan, and attorneys John Peck and Wayne B. Gongaware
from Greensburg represented the Commonwealth. Id. at 1034.
Justice Russell M. Nigro wrote the opinion for the majority of the court, which included
Chief Justice John P. Flaherty, Jr., and Justices Stephen A. Zappala and Ronald D. Castille.
Id. at 1034-38. Justice Ralph J. Cappy concurred in the result with no opinion, and Justice
Thomas G. Saylor filed a dissenting opinion, joined by Justice Sandra Schultz Newman. Id. at
1038-39 (Saylor, J., dissenting).
41. Id. at 1035.
42. Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Nolen, 535 Pa. 77 (1993)).
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Morgan, 739 A.2d at 1033.
46. Id at 1034. See Commonwealth v. Scott, 436 A.2d 607 (Pa. 1981). The court did not
rely on, or even cite, the recently enacted Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence, probably because
those rules were not adopted at the time of Morgan's trial.




defendant's specific acts of misconduct. 49 The court condemned the
practice of attempting to bring in testimony through the back door
that is not allowed in the front.5° Such questions of a character
witness present an abundance of injustice: facts do not have to be
established regarding the' incidents, and hearsay testimony is
permitted when such questions are allowed. 1 Additionally, and
perhaps most importantly to the court, a person who is asked if
they ever heard of such rumors are not afforded the opportunity to
discuss their views as to the truth of the rumors as they have
heard them.52
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Thomas G. Saylor noted that Rule
405(a) of the recently-enacted Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence
reflect the ability to cross-examine a character witness as to
knowledge of specific instances of prior misconduct, if such
instances are probative of the character trait at issue.5 Justice
Saylor pointed out that under the rule announced by the majority,
Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence would depart from the Federal
Rules of Evidence, which have been interpreted to permit
cross-examination of a character witness as to knowledge of
specific prior bad acts relevant to the character trait at issue.5
The supreme court clearly announced in this case that a criminal
defendant's character witness may not be impeached on
cross-examination through questions about allegations made against
the defendant that never led to criminal charges. Unfortunately, the
court did not expressly state that this would be its interpretation of
Rule 405(a) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence. Assuming that
the Morgan holding applies to Rule 405(a),15 it appears that
Pennsylvania now limits the cross-examination of a criminal
49. Id. at 1037.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Morgan, 739 k2d at 1037.
53. Id. at 1038 (Saylor, J., dissenting). Rule 405(a) states in its entirety as follows:
On cross-examination of a reputation witness, inquiry is allowable into specific
instances of conduct probative of the character trait in question, except that in
criminal cases inquiry into arrests of the accused not resulting in convictions is not
permissible.
PA- R. EVID. 405(a).
54. Morgan, 739 A.2d at 1038 (Saylor, J., dissenting) (citing United States v. Glass, 709
F2d 669, 673 (11th Cir. 1983) and United States v. Apfelbaum, 621 F2d 62, 65 (3d Cir. 1980)).
55. This assumption is reasonable considering that Rule 405(a) matches the holding in
Scott, which prohibits questioning about an arrest not resulting in conviction. The Scott
court's rationale, extending this prohibition to questioning about allegations not resulting in
an arrest because such allegations are equally consistent with innocence as with guilt,
applies equally to Rule 405(a).
2000
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defendant's character witness to personal knowledge of a prior
conviction of a crime that is relevant to the character trait at issue.
CRIMINAL LAW - SEARCHES AND SEIZURES - INVESTIGATIVE DETENTIONS
- An evenly divided Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed a
Pennsylvania Superior Court decision holding that a police officer's
continued questioning of a driver following the issuance of a traffic
citation constitutes an investigative detention, and if such detention
is not supported by a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, any
consent obtained by the officer to conduct a search is tainted by
the illegality of the detention.
Commonwealth v. Sierra, 723 A.2d 644 (Pa. 1999) (evenly divided
court).
Kevin Sierra was the passenger in a vehicle that was stopped by
West Manchester Township Police Officer Keith Roehm for
speeding on November 21, 1993.56 Upon pulling over the vehicle,
Roehm approached the car and asked the driver for his license and
registration.57 Roehn later testified that he was suspicious of the
occupants in the car, which had dealer plates, because they
appeared unusually nervous. 8 Additionally, Roehm noted that the
driver's license was expired, the driver had a gang tattoo under his
left eye, and the car contained numerous motorcycle parts that
Roehm believed to be stolen.59 When asked, the driver stated that
he had just bought the motorcycle parts and that the two were
"coming from a friend's house."6° These facts made Roehm inquire
of the occupants as to whether there was anything illegal in the
vehicle. 61 The driver replied that there was not.62 Roehm went back
to his patrol car and returned a few minutes later with a written
warning for speeding.6
By this time, another officer had arrived and stationed himself
next to the passenger side door.64 Roehm issued the driver a
56. See Commonwealth v. Sierra, 723 A.2d 644, 645 (Pa- 1999) (evenly divided court)
(opinion of Nigro, J., in support of affirmance).
57. See Sierra, 723 A.2d at 645.
58. See id.
59. See id.
60. See id. at 647 n.5.
61. See id. at 645.
62. See Sierra, 723 A.2d at 645.
63. See id.
64. See id. Officer Jeffrey Oberdorff was the officer who stationed himself by the
passenger door. See id. Oberdroff initially spotted the vehicle speeding, and radioed Roehn
to investigate because Obernoff was traveling in the opposite direction. See id.
Vol. 38:829
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citation, which the driver signed. After issuing the written warning,
Roehm again asked if the vehicle contained anything illegal; the
driver replied, "No, would you like to look?"6 Roehm accepted this
invitation and ordered the occupants out of the car.6 The officer
standing by the passenger door asked Sierra if he had any
weapons, and although Sierra replied that he did not, he was acting
suspiciously.67 The officer then performed a pat down search of
Sierra.6 The search revealed that Sierra had a loaded and cocked
semi-automatic handgun in the waistband of his pants.6 9 It was later
determined that the appellee did not have a license to carry the
gun; he was arrested and charged with illegally carrying a firearm.70
At a pretrial suppression hearing, the judge denied Sierra's
motion to suppress the physical evidence obtained; Sierra was
convicted and sentenced to a term of imprisonment.
71
Sierra appealed his conviction to the Pennsylvania Superior
Court, which reversed the suppression decision.72 It held that
"Officer Roehm lacked a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity
at the time of his second inquiry regarding the presence of illegal
items in the automobile and thus had no legitimate basis to
continue his investigation." 3 The continued detention of the vehicle
was therefore illegal, and tainted the subsequent consent to search
the car and the pat-down performed by the officers. 74 As a result,
according to the superior court, the evidence gathered during that
period was illegally obtained.75
The Commonwealth appealed, making three arguments for
reversal. 76 First, the Commonwealth argued that the superior court
erred in holding that an investigative detention had occurred.
77
Second, the Commonwealth asserted that even if a detention had
occurred, there were reasonable grounds present to justify such
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. See Sierra, 723 A.2d at 649 (opinion of Castille, J., in support of reversal). When
Sierra said that he had no weapons, "he continued to back away from the officer, patting the
pockets of a loose flannel shirt that he was wearing." See id.
68. See id.
69. See id.
70. See id. at 645 (opinion of Nigro, J., in support of affirmance).
71. See id.





77. See Sierra, 723 A.2d at 645 (opinion of Nigro, J., in support of affirmance).
.2000
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detention.78 Third, the Commonwealth contended that even if the
detention was improper, the evidence should not be suppressed
because the driver of the vehicle consented to the search.
79
After a review of the case, the justices of the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court were evenly divided, with three supporting
affirmance and three supporting reversal.80 Therefore, the superior
court's decision to reverse Sierra's conviction was affirmed.
8'
Justice Russell M. Nigro wrote an opinion in support of
affirmance, joined by Chief Justice John P Flaherty, Jr., and Justice
Stephen A. Zappala.82 This opinion began by determining that an
investigative detention did occur when Officer Roehm asked the
occupants of the vehicle an additional question after issuing the
warning for speeding, 3 Relying on Pennsylvania precedent, Justice
Nigro explained that an investigative detention takes place when a
law enforcement officer detains a person by some means that
would communicate to a reasonable person that they are not free
to exit the situation.84 When such a message is communicated to a
person, the rights and protections enumerated under the Fourth
Amendment of the United States Constitution are triggered.85
Justice Nigro reasoned that the occupants could not have been
expected to know that they were free to leave after the written
warning was issued.8 6 The two officers were still standing at either
frc;nt door of the vehicle.87 The second officer had come onto the
scene in the middle of the stop and enhanced the feeling of
containment.88 Additionally, Officer Roehm continued to question
the driver in such a manner that made it seem unlikely that the
driver had permission to leave.8 9 Therefore, according to Justice
Nigro, the officer's continued questioning constituted an
78. See id.
79. See id. at 645-46. At the supreme court, attorneys Joseph C. Adams and H. Stanley
Rebert from York represented the Commonwealth, and attorneys Michael F. Fenton and
Michael Baldauf represented Sierra. Id. at 644.
80. Id. at 644.
81. Id.
82. Sierra, 723 A.2d at 64548 (opinion of Nigro, J., in support of affirnance).
83. Id. at 646.
84. Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Lewis, 636 A.2d 619 (Pa, 1994)).
85. Id. Under United States Supreme Court jurisprudence, the Fourth Amendment
requires that an "investigative detention" be supported by reasonable suspicion. See
Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420 (1984).







Upon determining that the occupants were detained, Justice
Nigro examined the reasonableness of the stop to determine if the
detention was justified.91 Justice Nigro cited superior court cases
that make it illegal for an officer to detain a person stopped for a
traffic violation after the initial traffic violation has been resolved,
unless the officer can articulate a reasonable basis for believing
that further crime is afoot.92 Justice Nigro wrote that the reasons
Officer Roehm recited for the stop were not sufficient to form the
appropriate reasonable basis.
93
Finally, Justice Nigro dismissed the argument that the driver's
consent to search the car made the subsequent discovery of the
firearm proper, notwithstanding the fact that an illegal investigative
detention had occurred. 4 Justice Nigro wrote that if a close causal
relationship exists between the consent to search the vehicle and
an illegal detention, the consent is tainted.9 5 In this case, the
necessary break in the causal relationship was not found, because
consent was induced from the same question that triggered the
detention.9 6 Therefore, Justice Nigro found that such consent was
tainted.9 7
Justice Ronald D. Castille wrote an opinion in support of
reversal, joined by Justice Sandra Schultz Newman and joined in
part by Justice Ralph J. Cappy.98 This opinion, which harshly
90. Id. at 646.
91. Sierra, 723 A.2d at 647 (opinion of Nigro, J., in support of affirmance).
92. Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Lopez, 609 A.2d 177 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992) and
Commonwealth v. Parker, 619 A.2d 735 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993)).
93. Id. Of particular importance was the fact that "Roehm himself testified at the
suppression hearing that he had no indication of any on-going crime at the time he returned
the driver's documentation and questioned him about the contents of the car." Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 648 (citing United States v. Melendez-Garcia, 28 F.3d 1046, 1053 (10th Cir.
1994)).
96. Sierra, 723 A-2d at 648 (opinion of Nigro, J., in support of affirmance).
97. Id.
98. Sierra, 723 A.2d at 648-55 (opinion of Castille, J., in support of reversal). Id. Part
One of the opinion in support of reversal determined that the officer's continued questioning
did not constitute an investigative detention. Id. at 652 (stating that because "the actions of
the officers did not communicate the requisite coercion, this particular encounter did not
amount to an 'investigative detention' "). Part Two of the opinion in support of reversal
determined that even if there was an investigative detention, the trial court properly found
that there was sufficient evidence to establish that the officers had a reasonable suspicion to
detain the suspects. Id. at 654 (stating that "in light of the extremely limited nature of the
putative 'investigative detention,' the trial court properly determined that the evidence in the
record was more than sufficient to establish a reasonable belief that criminal activity was
afoot"). It was this determination in Part Two that Justice Cappy refused to join. Id. at 655.
2000 839
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criticized the other, found that Justice Nigro's basis for determining
the stop to be an investigative detention was flawed.9 Justice
Castille believed the facts did not give rise to a showing of coercive
conduct on the part of the police officers following the issuance of
the written warning for speeding.1i0 In fact, according to Justice
Castille, if the tactics used are deemed coercive, police would be
severely disadvantaged in attempting to execute any stop.
101
The justices writing for reversal believed that the additional
question asked by Officer Roehm to the driver was not
interrogatory in nature, even though he had previously asked the
same question.102 The questions were not asked in a "rapid-fire"
manner, and a substantial amount of time had elapsed after the
time the officer asked the first question and when he later repeated
his query. 3  These justices found that the question was reasonable
and not coercive because Officer Roehm had gone back to his
squad car and wrote out a warning after he asked the question the
first time.1 4 This single additional question did not convince the
dissenting justices that an investigative detention had occurred.
05
In addition, Justice Castille did not find the presence of an
additional officer at the passenger door to have added to a coercive
atmosphere.10 6 The justices relied on Florida v. Bostick,0 7 a
Supreme Court decision that held that it is lawful and permissible
for an officer to stand by the passenger door during a stop and
such conduct does not make the stop an investigative detention.08
They believed that allowing this conduct to be considered coercive
would encourage officers to refrain from taking the precautions
legally afforded to them by these prior holdings.109 The basis of the
prior holdings was to ensure police safety."0 Holding that such
conduct is coercive, the justices opined, will make such stops less
safe for officers."'
99. Id. at 648-49.
100. Id. at 649.
101. Id. at 651-52.
102. Id. at 652.
103. Sierra, 723 A.2d at 651-52 (opinion of Castille, J., in support of reversal).
104. Id. at 652.
105. Id. at 651.
106. Id.
107. 501 U.S. 429 (1991).
108. Sierra, 723 A.2d at 651 (opinion of Castille, J., in support of reversal) (citing
Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 439 (1991)).
109. Id. at 652.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 651-52.
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The split of opinion by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court allowed
the decision of the superior court to stand as precedent. The
superior court's ruling clarified Pennsylvania law regarding
searches and seizures. An investigative detention may occur if the
police twice pose the same question to a suspect, if such
questioning communicates to a reasonable person that they are not
free to leave the current scene. Therefore, police must be able to
articulate a reasonable basis for detaining the suspect or risk
having such a detention considered illegal. Further, even if a
suspect consents to a search during the course of this illegal
detainment, the consent will be tainted if no break has occurred
between the illegality and the consent.
CRIMINAL LAW - SEARCHES AND SEIZURES - SEIZURE OF WEAPONS IN
CASES INVOLVING DOMESTIC VIOLENCE - The Pennsylvania Supreme
Court held that the seizure of a weapon pursuant to a Pennsylvania
statute that requires the police to seize weapons in certain cases
involving domestic violence is subject to the limits of existing
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.
Commonwealth v. Wright, 742 A.2d 661 (Pa. 1999).
At about 11:00 p.m. on September 21, 1995, Randolph W. Wright
came home to his trailer, where he lived with his wife and their
nine-year-old son. 12 Wright found his wife sleeping in their son's
bedroom, whereupon he produced a nine-millimeter handgun and
fired a shot over her head and forcibly removed her to the living
room.113 Wright argued with his wife in the living room, placing the
gun against his chin and telling her to pull the trigger."' Wright
then shot his wife, causing a glazing injury to her head; their son
called 911 and reported the shooting."'
Two state troopers arrived at the scene, observed a spent
nine-millimeter shell casing near a screen door, announced
themselves, and subsequently placed Wright under arrest."' After
emergency personnel arrived at the scene and Wright's son was
taken to a neighbor's home, the troopers "secured the scene.""7
Wright admitted firing a nine-millimeter handgun and the police
112. See Commonwealth v. Wright, 742 A.2d 661, 662 (Pa, 1999).
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maintained tlie security of the home."' Upon the arrival of a third
trooper and without the consent of Wright or his wife, the troopers
searched appellant's home and found the handgun, loaded and
cocked, under Wright's mattress."9 At that time, Wright was
charged with criminal attempt-homicide, two counts of aggravated
assault, and two counts of reckless endangerment. 20
Wright filed a pretrial motion attempting to suppress the seized
firearms, asserting that the warrantless search of his home was
illegal. 121 The suppression court denied the motion, finding that
under the Pennsylvania Crimes Code, the police were authorized to
conduct a warrantless search of Wright's house following his
assault against his wife and son, and to seize any weapons
discovered during that search. 22 Before a jury trial, Wright was
found guilty of all charges with the exception of the aggravated
assault charge related to his son.123 In a memorandum opinion, 24 a
divided panel of the superior court affirmed the decision of the
trial court.125 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court allowed appeal to
"consider the propriety of the search and seizure." 26
118. See Wright, 742 A.2d at 662.
119. See id. The police also discovered under the mattress a .380-caliber pistol. See id.
120. See id. at 663.
121. See id.
122. See id.; 18 PA. CoNs. STAT. § 2711 (1994). This section of the Pennsylvania Crimes
Code requires the police to seize any weapons used in the commission of certain
enumerated offenses, including domestic violence. Id. at § 2711(b).
123. See Wright, 742 A.2d at 663.
124. Commonwealth v. Wright, 718 A.2d 351 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998).
125. Wright, 742 A.2d at 663. In the superior court's lead opinion, Judge Michael T.
Joyce held that the search was justified pursuant to title 18, section 2711(b) of the
Pennsylvania Crimes Code, which requires the seizure of weapons used in domestic violence
offenses, and that this power conferred upon the troopers the power to search. See id. In
addition, Judge Joyce found exigent circumstances, namely the safety of the mother and son
that lived there, that required the troopers to remove the weapons. See id. Judge Olszewski
concurred, holding that the search was a violation of the appellant's protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment to the United
States Constitution, but that exigent circumstances existed to justify the search. Judge John
T. J. Kelly, Jr., also concurred, holding that the search was proper as incident to a lawful
arrest. See id.
126. Id. At the supreme court, attorneys Sidney Sokolsky and Norma Chase from the
Pittsburgh law firm of Ecker, Ecker, & Ecker, and David Crowley from the Centre County
Public Defender's Office represented Wright; attorney Gregory Defloria, the Assistant District
Attorney for Centre County, represented the Commonwealth. Id. at 662.
Justice Thomas G. Saylor wrote the opinion for the majority of the court, which included
Chief Justice John P. Flaherty, Jr., and Justices Stephen A. Zappala and Ralph J. Cappy. Id. at
662-66. Justice Ronald D. Castille wrote a separate opinion concurring in part and dissenting
in part, and was joined by Justice Sandra Schultz Newman. Id. at 666-69 (Castille, J.,
concurring and dissenting). Justice Russell M. Nigro also wrote a separate opinion,
concurring in part and dissenting in part. Id. at 669 (Nigro, J., concurring and dissenting).
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Initially, the court asserted that a tension exists between the
government's interest in protecting the victims of abuse and a
criminal suspect's right under the United States Constitution's
Fourth Amendment to be free from unreasonable searches and
seizures. 127 The court stated that a plain reading of Section 2711 of
the Pennsylvania Crimes Code requires police officers to seize
weapons used in domestic violence offenses, but does not specify
the methods by which the seizures are to be conducted. 128 Rejecting
the Commonwealth's argument that Section 2711 authorizes
warrantless searches, the court held that Section 2711 is subject to
the limits of existing Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.
129
As an alternative argument, the Commonwealth asserted that the
search was proper under the exigent circumstances exception to
the warrant requirements of the Fourth Amendment. 30 The court
rejected this argument, holding that the facts here did not present a
situation in which the delay in obtaining a warrant would have
subjected Wright's wife and son to further risk of physical harm
and, therefore, the exigent circumstances exception to the Fourth
Amendment did not apply.'
3 '
Justice Ronald D. Castille filed a concurring and dissenting
opinion in which Justice Sandra Schultz Newman joined.' 32 Justice
Castille agreed with the majority that Section 2711(b) must be
interpreted in accordance with the Fourth Amendment, but differed
in his belief that exigent circumstances existed that justified the
search of appellant's home.1m In addition, Justice Castille believed
127. Id.
128. Id. at 664.
129. Id. The court thus agreed with Judge Olszewski of the superior court and stated
that "to construe Section 2711(b) as authorizing warrantless searches whenever a weapon is
implicated in domestic violence case .. . would create a new categorical exception to the
Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement." Id. The court went on to say that "[b]ecause we
are obliged to construe the enactments of the General Assembly in harmony with
constitutional requirements . . . a more tenable reading . .. requires the police to seize a
weapon when the intrusion is otherwise permissible." Id.
130. Wright, 742 A.2d at 664. The exigent circumstances exception to the warrant
requirement of the Fourth Amendment allows police to conduct a limited search in domestic
violence situations involving imminent physical harm in order to remove an item of potential
harm. Id.
131. Id. at 666. The court stated that at the time of the search and seizure, the risk of
potential harm was nonexistent because Wright was in custody, the wife was in the hospital,
the son was at his grandparents, and the area had been secured by the police. Id.
132. Id. at 666 (Castille, J., concurring and dissenting).
133. Id. (Castille, J., concurring and dissenting). Justice Castille argued that the
existence of loaded weapons in a home where a nine-year-old child lived and was likely to
soon return constituted exigent circumstances. Id. (Castille, J., concurring and dissenting).
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that, given all of the other evidence, the admission of the firearms
was harmless error.'34
Justice Nigro filed a brief concurring and dissenting opinion in
which he stated his agreement with the majority on the
constitutional issues involved in the case, but dissented because he
felt that the admission of the seized firearm was harmless error.13
CRIMINAL LAW - SEARCHES AND SEIZURES - CONSENT TO BE SEARCHED
- The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the federal
voluntariness standard for consensual, warrantless searches
satisfies the privacy requirements of the Pennsylvania Constitution.
Commonwealth v. Cleckley, 738 A.2d 427 (Pa. 1999).
On December 23, 1995, Officer John Deluca of the Borough of
Koppel Police Department received information that Joseph
Cleckley was selling drugs inside a local bar.136 Locating Cleckley
inside the bar, the officer informed him of the accusations against
him and requested that he follow him outside.' 37 Once outside,
Cleckley consented to the officer's request to "pat him down,"
whereupon the officer discovered some crack cocaine and cash.' 1
Cleckley was charged with possession and possession with intent
to deliver.' 39 The trial court denied Cleckley's pretrial motion to
suppress the evidence; Cleckley argued that it was obtained in
violation of his right against unreasonable searches under Article 1,
Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution.1 40 Cleckley was found
guilty after a trial by jury and, on appeal, the Pennsylvania Superior
Court affirmed.' 41 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted
Cleckley's petition for allowance for appeal in order, to determine
whether, under the privacy rights guaranteed by the Pennsylvania
Constitution, the subject of a consensual search must knowingly
and intelligently waive his right to refuse consent.
42
134. Id. at 667-68 (Castille, J., concurring and dissenting).
135. Id. at 669 (Nigro, J., concurring and dissenting).
136. See Commonwealth v. Cleckley, 738 A.2d 427, 428 (Pa. 1999).
137. See Cleckley, 738 A.2d at 428.
138. See id.
139. See id. Appellant was charged with possession and possession with intent to
deliver under title 35, section 780-113(a)(16) and title 35, section 780-113(a)(30) of the
Pennsylvania Crimes Code. See id at 429.
140. See id. at 429. Article I, Section 8 is Pennsylvania's counterpart to the United
States Constitution's prohibition, under the Fourth Amendment, of unreasonable searches
and seizures. See id.
141. See id.
142. Cleckley, 738 A.2d at 429. At the supreme court, attorney John J. Petrush, Jr., from
San Francisco, California represented Cleckley, and attorneys Theresa Ferris-Dukovich and
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Writing for the majority, Justice Ralph J. Cappy began by stating
that under both the United States Constitution and the
Pennsylvania Constitution, a warrantless search is per se
unreasonable unless certain specific exceptions apply, one of which
is valid consent.'4 Consent is deemed valid only when given
voluntarily; Cleckley argued that the test for such voluntariness
should include a knowing and intelligent waiver.'4 In other words,
Cleckley argued that when asking a criminal suspect for consent to
do a pat-down search, police in Pennsylvania should be required to
tell the suspect that he has the right to refuse to consent to the
search. The court noted that the United States Supreme Court's
decision in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte145 had already rejected this
precise argument in the federal realm. 46 In Schneckloth, the United
States Supreme Court enunciated the voluntariness standard and
held that, for a search to be voluntary and, therefore, valid under
the Fourth Amendment, an individual does not have to knowingly
and intelligently waive his consent.
147
Cleckley argued that despite the fact that a knowing and
intelligent waiver is not required under the Fourth Amendment,
Pennsylvania should adopt such a standard under the Pennsylvania
Constitution because of the enhanced privacy protections under
Article 1, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution and
Pennsylvania case law interpreting that section.148 The court
rejected Cleckley's argument by distinguishing the cases that
Cleckley cited and holding that the privacy rights protected by the
Pennsylvania Constitution regarding consent to a search are
sufficiently protected under the federal standard for voluntariness
set out in Schneckloth.
49
Ahmed Aziz from Beaver represented the Commonwealth. Id. at 428.
Justice Ralph J. Cappy wrote the opinion for the majority of the court, which included
Chief Justice John P. Flaherty, Jr., and Justices Stephen A. Zappala, Ronald D. Castille,
Sandra Schultz Newman, and Thomas G. Saylor. Id. at 428-33. Justice Russell M. Nigro filed a
dissenting opinion. Id. at 433-35 (Nigro, J., dissenting).
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. 412 U.S. 218, (1973).
146. Cleckley, 738 A.2d at 429.
147. Id. at 430.
148. Id. at 430 (citing Commonwealth v. Gibson, 638 A.2d 203 (Pa. 1994) and
Commonwealth v. Melendez, 676 A.2d 226 (Pa. 1996)).
149. Id. The court easily distinguished both Gibson and Melendez, stating that neither
of the parties in the cases cited by Cleckley. consented to the searches, as opposed to
Cleckley himself, who gave the police permission to the "pat him down." Id. After reviewing
similar state court decisions, the Cleckley court found that there were no sound policy
reasons to broaden the protection granted under the Fourth Amendment, and that the
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The court concluded by stating that, while actual knowledge of
the ability to waive consent to search is not required, it is an
important factor in determining the validity of consent, but "is not
a determinative factor since other evidence is oftentimes adequate
to prove the voluntariness of a consent."' 50 In the instant case,
based upon the Court's reasoning and appellant's consent to the
"pat down," the holding of the superior court was affirmed.'5 '
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Russell M. Nigro argued that
the court's reliance upon Schneckloth was misplaced because
Article 1, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution has always
afforded broader privacy rights than those available under the
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.15 2 In addition,
Justice Nigro stated that in order for consent to be voluntarily
given, the individual being searched must know that he has the
right to refuse consent.'1 Furthermore, Justice Nigro, disagreeing
with the majority, argued that requiring the police to advise an
individual of his right to refuse consent 'would not hamper police
activities nor prejudice the Commonwealth. 15
While it is generally agreed that Article 1, Section 8 of the
Pennsylvania Constitution provides a criminal suspect with greater
protections than the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution, Cleckley demonstrates the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court's reluctance to extend that protection beyond the federal
standard in cases involving consent to a pat-down search.
CRIMINAL LAW - VEHICULAR HOMICIDE WHILE DRIVING UNDER THE
INFLUENCE - DEATH OF AN UNBORN CHILD - The Pennsylvania
Superior Court held that a fetus that has reached the stage of
viability will be considered a "person" as that term is used in the
Pennsylvania criminal statute punishing homicide by vehicle while
driving under the influence.
"federal voluntariness standard enunciated in Schneckloth adequately protects the privacy
rights obtained under Article 1, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution." Id. at 433.
150. Id. at 433.
151. Cleckley, 738 A.2d at 433.
152. Id. at 434 (Nigro, J., dissenting).
153. Id. at 434 (Nigro, J., dissenting). Justice Nigro argued that many individuals,
confronted by a police officer, do not realize that they may refuse the search or may be too
intimidated to deny consent and, therefore, permit a search to occur when they would not
otherwise have consented to it. Id. (Nigro, J., dissenting).
154. Id. at 435 (Nigro, J., dissenting). Disagreeing with the majority, Justice Nigro does
not believe that the requirement of informed consent will decrease the number of searches
that police will be able to legally perform and points to the Fifth Amendment requirements
in the wake of Miranda. Id. (Nigro, J., dissenting).
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Commonwealth v. Booth, 729 A.2d 1187 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1999),
appeal granted, 747 A.2d 897 (Pa. Dec. 3, 1999).
An allegedly intoxicated Jeffery Booth was driving his car in
North Huntington Township on June 29, 1997, when he collided
with a car driven by Nancy Boehm."5 Boehm was thirty-three
weeks pregnant at the time of the accident, and the unborn child
died as a result of injuries sustained in the collision.
156
As a result of the accident, Booth was charged, among other
things, with one count of homicide by vehicle while driving under
the influence. 57 Through a pre-trial motion, Booth moved that this
charge be dismissed, arguing that an unborn child cannot qualify as
a "person," thereby preventing Booth from being charged with any
type of homicide. 1' s The trial judge granted the motion on June 2,
1998, and the charge was dismissed.
159
The Commonwealth appealed to the Pennsylvania Superior
Court, challenging the lower court's holding that a viable fetus is
not a person for the purposes of Pennsylvania's homicide by
vehicle while driving under the influence statute.16°
In an opinion by Judge Olszewski, a three-judge panel of the
superior court reversed the trial court decision and held that a
viable fetus is in fact a person under the statute.16 ' The court cited
to the past holdings of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in civil
cases involving this issue and found it appropriate to extend those
holdings to this criminal matter. 6
2
In the 1985 case of Amadio v. Levin,1 the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court held that the estate of a viable fetus would have
standing to bring a cause of action for wrongful death.'l In making
this decision, the court established that the common law "born
155. See Commonwealth v. Booth, 729 A.2d 1187 (Pa. 1999), appeal granted, 747 A.2d
897 (Pa. Dec. 3, 1999).
156. See Booth, 729 A.2d at 1187.
157. See id. The appellee was also charged with seven other counts including homicide
by vehicle. See id. However, these charges were not relevant to this appeal.
158. See id. at 1188.
159. See id.
160. See Booth, 729 A.2d at 1188.
161. Id. At the superior court, attorney Wayne B. Gongaware, the Greensburg Assistant
District Attorney, represented the Commonwealth, and attorney Patrick J. Thomassey from
Monroeville represented Booth. Id. Judge Olszewski wrote the majority opinion, joined by
Judge Correale F. Stevens. Id. at 1188-90. Judge Joseph A. Del Sole filed a dissenting opinion.
Id. at 1190-91 (Del Sole, J., dissenting).
162. Id. at 1188-89 (citing Amadio v. Levin, 501 A.2d 1089 (Pa. 1985)).
163. 501 A.2d 1089 (Pa. 1985).
164. Booth, 729 A-2d at 1189 (citing Amadio, 501 A.2d at 1089).
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alive" rule would no longer apply in Pennsylvania civil cases.' 65 The
Amadio court did not specifically address the issue of whether
such a holding should also extend to criminal cases. 166 However,
the superior court in Booth rationalized that such an extension was
logical.'67
Borrowing from the supreme court's rationale in Amadio, the
superior court reasoned that medical science has advanced to a
point where proof of cause of death can be established even if the
child is not "born alive."1' In the past, courts did not consider a
fetus a "person" until the fetus was born alive because only at that
point could it be determined with accuracy by medical technology
how such a person subsequently died.169 The superior court stated
that "[i]t is time for the courts of this Commonwealth to react to
advances in medical science rather than ignore such progress."' 70
Furthermore, the Booth court purported to extend its rationale
beyond just the Pennsylvania statute punishing homicides by
vehicle while driving under the influence to "the meaning of the
criminal laws of general application in this Commonwealth."
171
Judge Joseph A. Del Sole dissented, asserting that the court was
strictly bound by the text of the Pennsylvania Crimes Code to
reach an opposite conclusion in this case. 72 The Pennsylvania
Crimes Code expressly enumerates certain crimes "in which an
unborn child is the victim."'73 Judge Del Sole noted that homicide
by vehicle while driving under the influence is not one of these
enumerated crimes, and that criminal law in Pennsylvania is
governed entirely by statutory law and strict judicial interpretations
of those statutes.'74 As a result, Judge Del Sole would have held
that only those provisions of the Pennsylvania Crimes Code that
expressly include unborn children as potential victims can be used
to prosecute on behalf of an unborn fetus.
75
The superior court, by ruling that a viable fetus is a person under
165. Id. "The 'born alive' rule refers to the common law requirement that only those
humans surviving a live birth are independent persons within the meaning of the law." Id. at
1189 n.5.
166. Id. at 1189-90.
167. Id. at 1190.
168. Id.
169. Booth, .729 A.2d at 1190.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 1191 (Del Sole, J., dissenting).
173. Id. (Del Sole, J., dissenting). See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 2600-2605 (1997).
174. Booth, 729 A.2d at 1191.
175. Id.
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Pennsylvania criminal statutes, has essentially established that a
viable. fetus will be considered a person for all purposes under
Pennsylvania law. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has already
concluded that this is the law in civil cases. As Judge Del Sole
pointed out in his dissent, this is a broad reading of the
Pennsylvania Crimes Code when considered in light of the fact that
the Pennsylvania legislature has already spoken as to certain
crimes involving unborn children.

